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Abstract
We analyze a sequential decision model with endogenous ordering in which
decision makers are allowed to choose the time of acting (exercising a risky
investment option) or waiting. We show the existence of a unique symmetric
equilibrium and characterize information cascade under endogenous ordering.
Further, if there are two or more risky investment options, individuals tend to
wait longer with competition. Hence, we could end up with a dilemma: more
options might be worse.
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1 Introduction
How do people make sequential decisions under imperfect information? One may
learn from his own experiences or from other people's choices. For instance, individu-
als currently using a particular software package may also have the choice of upgrad-
ing to some new software packages. They may have some knowledge about the new
software packages. But if the new software packages are brand new and private infor-
mation is limited, individuals may be inclined to wait for other people to discourse
more information about the newly released software packages before they take any
action. If the information previously aggregated dominates their own private infor-
mation, individuals ignore their own private information and follow their predecessors
{ information cascade occurs.1 Information cascade prevents the aggregation of
information. Therefore, the initial realization of signals can have long-term conse-
quences and information cascade is often error prone. The decisions of the rst few
individuals' can have a disproportional eect.
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), hereafter BHW, and Banerjee (1992)
investigate information cascade under exogenous ordering, in which the decision
ordering is exogenously given and only one individual moves in each period. The
restaurant example in Banerjee (1992) may t the exogenous ordering setting.2 But
in many other cases, endogenous ordering which allows individuals to choose the
time of acting or waiting may be more appropriate. For instance, when individuals
decide to buy a new car or computer, they have the option to buy immediately or
to wait. With endogenous ordering, there exist strategic interactions among decision
makers. Due to the free-rider problem, some decision makers may have incentives
to delay their decisions and learn from other decision makers, while others make
decisions immediately if they feel condent that their decisions will produce desirable
results. Furthermore, more than one individual can act or wait during the same
period and consequently their decisions can be clustered together. Thus, under the
endogenous ordering setting, the insight will be completely dierent from that under
the exogenous ordering setting.
Continuing with the software upgrading example, suppose there are a number of
new software packages Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, available for upgrading, whereM is some
nite integer. Individuals are currently using a software package B. It is known that
with some prior probability Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, is better than B. Each individual
also gets private signals indicating whether Aj, j 2 1; 2; :::;M , is better than B or
1Celen and Kariv (2004) attempt to make the distinction between herding and information cas-
cades. They point out that in a herd, individuals choose the same action; but they may have
acted dierently if the realization of private signals had been dierent. In an information cascade,
individuals ignore their own private information and follow their predecessors.
2In the restaurant example in Banerjee (1992), there are two restaurants next to each other.
Individuals arrive at the restaurants in sequence. Observing the choices made by people before
them, they decide on either one of the two restaurants.
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not. Upgrading to Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, is an irreversible choice. Once they upgrade
to Aj, they are committed to their decisions.
3 They cannot switch back to B, or
upgrade to Am, for m 6= j. But there is no commitment to continuing using B. If
individuals have not upgraded, they continue to have the option of doing so.4 As
there are a number of new software packages, naturally there exists \competition"
among them. The further question of inquiry is: will information cascade be more or
less error prone with competition?
We analyze an endogenous ordering sequential decision model in which decision
makers are allowed to choose the time of upgrading to some new software package Aj,
j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, or waiting (continuing using the current software package B). To
emphasize the information aspect, we focus on pure information externalities: each
decision maker's payo only depends on his own action and the state of nature.
We show the existence of a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
with the following monotonicity property: in each period there exists critical types
of individuals who upgrade with probability less than one; individuals with private
signals indicating higher values upgrade with probability one; others wait. In this
equilibrium, typically there is a strategic phase, followed by a cascading phase. In
the strategic phase, depending on their own private signals, some individuals up-
grade, while others wait. In the cascading phase, all the remaining individuals
either upgrade immediately or wait forever regardless of their own private signals.
Consequently, there exists either an investment surge or a collapse. Further, if there
are two or more risky investment options, individuals tend to wait longer with com-
petition. Hence, we could end up with a dilemma: more options might be worse.5
There are some papers which investigate the decision problem with endogenous
ordering. For example, Chamley and Gale (1994) investigate a discrete time invest-
ment model which assumes the timing of decisions is endogenous, that is, individuals
try to nd the best place in the decision-making queue to undertake a protable
but risky investment. In their model, there are only two types of individuals: those
with investment option and those without. Those individuals without investment
option are assumed to be passive. Further, there is only one risky investment. In
contrast, in our model we allow for a nite number types of individuals and two or
more investment alternatives. Given one's own signals, each individual decides either
to act immediately or to wait and learn the true value of the investment options by
observing other individuals' actions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model with one
3There exists extremely high \disruption costs" involved in upgrading. In other words, we could
see this upgrade as a perpetual American call option. Individuals are free to exercise the option at
any time they want. But once they exercise the option, they cannot reverse their decision.
4Throughout the paper, we use the software upgrading example to illustrate our model.
5Schwartz (2004) argues that eliminating choices can greatly reduce anxiety of our lives, which
focuses on the psychological aspects of connection between choice and anxiety.
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risky investment option and shows the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium
with the monotonicity property. Then we characterize information cascade under
endogenous ordering. Section 3 extends the model with two or more risky investment
options. Section 4 investigates the impact of competition with two or more investment
options and discuss our main results. Several extensions are discussed in section 5.
2 One Risky Investment Option
As a benchmark, we start with the case with one risky investment option. There are
N individuals. All are rational and risk neutral. There is a new software package
A1 available for upgrading. Individuals currently use software package B. Assume
that the true value of A1, denoted by V1, is chosen by nature at the beginning of the
game, and is unknown to the individuals.6 Individuals know V1 follows some prior
distribution F1(V1), with density f1(V1). To emphasize the information aspect, we
concentrate on pure information externalities: each individual's payo only depends
on his own action and the state of nature.
We focus on the case that upgrading to A1 is an irreversible binary choice.
7 Once
they upgrade to A1, they are committed to their decisions. They cannot switch back
to B. But there is no commitment to continuing using B. If individuals have not
upgraded, they continue to have the option of doing so. The indivisibility of the action
space is important. As in Banerjee (1992), since the choices made by individuals are
not sucient statistics for the information they have, the error prone information
cascade can occur.8
At the beginning of the game, individual i in the market observes some condition-
ally independent private signal 1i 2 fs11; s12; : : : ; s1D1g, where s11 < s12 < : : : < s1D1
6Rosenberg (1976) points out that there exist two types of technological uncertainty. First, when
an innovation is introduced, it may have some imperfections: \Innumerable `bugs' may need to be
worked out. The rst user often takes considerable risk." In addition, current innovation could be
improved further in the future. There are two possible situations for the future possible improvement:
expected or unexpected. If it is expected, then it only increases the benet from waiting by some
constant amount. If it is unexpected, it will not aect the strategic interactions of the current game
until it happens. Thus, we ignore the second type of technological uncertainty here. When we
investigate the switch from one innovation to another, the future improvement, either expected or
unexpected, could be incorporated.
7Similar to Grenadier (1999), we could see this upgrade as a perpetual American call option. In
Grenadier (1999), decisions are made in continuous time and there is a state variable, which follows
some exogenous continuous time stochastic process. In this paper, we assume discrete time decision
and no exogenous state variable.
8Banerjee (1992) assumes a continuous action space and gets similar information cascade results
as BHW. This is due to the degenerate payo function as pointed out by BHW. Park (2001) as-
sumes perfect observability, and hence in his model players share the same information and hidden
information is not an issue.
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and D1 is some nite integer. 
1
i follows some distribution F1(
1
i jV1), with den-
sity f1(
1
i jV1). Assume F1(1i jV1) satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP)9 with respect to V1:
f1(1i jfV1)
f1(1i jV1)
increasing in 1i , for eV1 > V1. That is, individu-
als are more likely to get a higher private signal (indicating higher value of A1) if the
underlying V1 is higher.
With endogenous ordering, individuals are allowed to choose the time of upgrading
to the new software package A1 or waiting (continuing using the current software
package B). There exist strategic interactions among the individuals. The timing of
endogenous ordering is as follows:
In period 1, each individual decides to upgrade to A1 or to wait. If he
waits in period 1, he gets reservation utility V0, normalized to zero, and
has the option of upgrading later.
In period 2, all the remaining individuals decide to upgrade to A1 or to
wait after observing others' actions in period 1.
The subsequent periods are the same as period 2. The game continues
until everyone upgrades to A1. The time period is denoted by t, t =
1; 2; 3; :::.
The benet from waiting is the information revealed about A1 by other individuals.
The cost of waiting is the dierence between the gain from A1 and the reservation
utility. Denote individual i's action at date t by xi;t, where xi;t = 1 if he upgrades
to A1 at date t and xi;t = 0 if he waits. Let xt  (x1;t; :::; xN;t) denote the outcome
at date t. If individual i upgrades to A1 in period t, then in the following periods,
everyone knows individual i upgrades to A1 in period t. The history of the game at
the beginning of period t is a sequence of outcomes ht = (x1; :::; xt 1).10 The common
discount factor is  2 (0; 1).
Let 1i;t(V1j1i ;ht) denote individual i's posterior belief about the true value of A1
given the history of the game ht and his own information 
1
i at the beginning of period
t. The probability that individual i who has not yet upgraded does so after observing
the history ht is denoted by 
1
i;t(
1
i ;ht). Then a behavioral strategy is a function
1i;t : H ! [0; 1].
Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A PBE consists of
a strategy  and a probability assessment , such that (i) each individual's strategy
is a best response at every information set and (ii) the probability assessments are
consistent with Bayes' rule at every information set that is reached with positive
probability.
9Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) point out that MLRP holds for exponential type families
(binomial with the same number of trials, normal with equal variances, etc.) as well as for some
non-exponential cases such as uniform with the same left endpoint.
10As the prior, x0 = 0 and hence h1 = x0 = 0.
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Let's see the incentive for upgrading and waiting respectively. The expected ben-
et from upgrading to A1 in period t for individual i is:
UA1(1i ;ht) = EV1j1i ;htV1 (1)
The expected benet from waiting in period t for individual i is:
UW (1i ;ht; 
1
 i;t) = EHt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)

maxfUA1(1i ;ht+1);UW (1i ;ht+1;1 i;t+1)g

(2)
where 1 i;t represents the strategy prole of all other individuals except for individual
i in period t; Ht+1(
1
i ;ht; 
1
 i;t) represents the set of histories at the beginning of period
t + 1 given 1i , ht and 
1
 i;t. From equation 2, we can solve the benet from waiting
forever UW = 0. The following lemma shows that under the worst news (no one is
willing to upgrade), the waiting information cascade starts in the following period.
Lemma 1 If 1i;t = 0 for all i, then 
1
i; = 0 for any  > t and i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, for suciently pessimistic beliefs, no one is willing to upgrade. This
is the worst news and also an absorbing state. Under this worst news, individuals
will never upgrade to A1 and the waiting information cascade starts in the following
period. This implies, to keep upgrade going, at least one individual must upgrade to
A1 in each period. Thus, with a nite number of N individuals, the game lasts at
most N periods before a cascading phase starts.11
In this paper, we focus on symmetric equilibrium. The following proposition
shows that for any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone with respect to personal
private signals. That is, individuals with higher private signals have higher incentive
to upgrade.
Proposition 1 For individual i, UA1(1i ;ht)   UW (1i ;ht; 1 i;t) is increasing in 1i ,
for any ht and 
1
 i;t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, as assumed, the conditionally independent private signals satises
MLRP with respect to the true value of V1. By Bayes' rule, the posterior distribution
of V1 satises MLRP with respect to private signals. That is, if an individual gets a
higher private signal, given the same history, he believes that V1 will be higher. So,
UA1(1i ;ht) > U
A1(e1i ;ht) for 1i > e1i and any ht. Further, by lemma 1, with a nite
number of N individuals, the game lasts at most N periods before a cascading phase
11We may end up with no cascading phase at all. In this case, only the strategic phase exists.
Still, the game lasts at most N periods before the game ends.
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starts. Let T denote the period when a cascading phase starts. Lemma 1 implies
T  N + 1. With a cascading phase starting in period T , no more new information
is disclosed thereafter. That is, UW (1i ;hT ;
1
 i;T ) = U
W (e1i ;hT ; 1 i;T ) = 0. Thus, in
period T , UA1(1i ;hT ) UW (1i ;hT ;1 i;T ) > UA1(e1i ;hT ) UW (e1i ;hT ;1 i;T ), for any
hT and 1 i;T . By backward induction, for any t  T , UA1(1i ;ht) UW (1i ;ht; 1 i;t) >
UA1(e1i ;ht)  UW (e1i ;ht; 1 i;t), which is true for any ht and 1 i;t.
Based on the proposition above, we create an ordering \index" about private
signals: (1;ht;
1
 ;t) = U
A1(1;ht)   UW (1;ht;1 ;t), which is strictly increasing
in 1 for any ht and 
1
 ;t, where 
1
 ;t is the behavior strategy prole for all other
remaining individuals in period t.12 In addition, letW1t (ht) denote the set of possible
remaining types in period t.13 The following proposition shows the existence of a
unique symmetric PBE, in which individuals with higher index of private signals
upgrading earlier till a cascading phase starts.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique symmetric PBE, in which typically there is
a strategic phase, followed by a cascading phase. In the strategic phase, the equilib-
rium strategy prole is a sequence of decreasing critical types f1t (ht)gt and a sequence
of probability of critical types f
1t (ht)
gt: in period t, individuals with (;ht; 1 ;t) >
(1t (ht);ht;
1
 ;t) upgrade;
14 the critical type individuals upgrade with probability 
1t (ht)
2
[0; 1); others wait.15 If a cascading phase starts, all the remaining individuals in the
game either upgrade immediately or wait forever.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, by lemma 1, with a nite number of N individuals, the game lasts
at most N periods before a cascading phase starts. Further, by Proposition 1, for
any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone with respect to personal private signals.
Consider Gn(ht), the subgame starting from period t with history ht, where n is the
number of individuals remaining. There are three possible cases as follows.
(1) If beliefs are suciently optimistic about A1, all the remaining individuals
upgrade to A1 and A1-upgrading information cascade occurs: W1 (h ) = ; for all
 > t. To illustrate, A1-upgrading information cascade occurs in period t when
1t (ht) = s
1
1 and 1t (ht)
= 1. All the remaining individuals upgrade to A1 in period t
12With a slight abuse of notation, from now on we drop the subscript i to indicate the term applied
to any individual in the game.
13As s1D1 is the highest possible remaining type in period 1, W11 (h1) = f  j s11    s1D1g.
14Since (1;ht;
1
 ;t) is strictly increasing in 
1, (;ht;
1
 ;t) > (1t (ht);ht;
1
 ;t) is equivalent
to saying  > 1t (ht).
15Note, 
1t (ht)
< 1 so that 1t (ht) is the highest possible remaining type in period t + 1. Hence,
W1t+1(ht+1) = f  j s11    1t (ht)g.
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regardless of their own private signal and the game ends (see gure 1). Consequently,
there exists an investment surge.
 
1
1
Ds
1
1s
1( )h 

t
1A -Upgrading  
Information Cascade 
Strategic Phase 
Figure 1: A1-Upgrading Information Cascade
(2) If beliefs are suciently pessimistic about A1, all the remaining individu-
als wait and waiting information cascade starts. To illustrate, waiting informa-
tion cascade starts in period t when 1t (ht) = 
1
t 1(ht 1) and 1t (ht) = 0. Since
no more new information is disclosed thereafter, the game reaches an absorbing state:
1 (h ) = 
1
 1(h 1), 1 (h ) = 0, and W1 (h ) = W1 1(h 1) for all   t (see g-
ure 2). Consequently, there exists an investment collapse.
 
1
1
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1
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1( )h 

t
Waiting Information 
Cascade 
Strategic Phase 
Figure 2: Waiting information cascade
(3) Otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity implies there exists
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a critical type 1t (ht)  1t 1(ht 1), such that(
(1;ht;
1
 ;t) = U
A1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) > 0 if 1 > 1t (ht)
(1;ht;
1
 ;t) = U
A1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) < 0 if 1 < 1t (ht)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on the realization of the
private signals of the n individuals remaining in the game. If all private signals are
greater than 1t (ht), all the remaining individuals upgrade and the game ends. If all
private signals are less than 1t (ht), all the remaining individuals will wait forever.
Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) some upgrade and others wait; (ii) some
are indierent between upgrading and waiting, while others upgrade or wait for sure.
For the latter sub-scenario, from (1t (ht);ht;
1
 ;t) = U
A1(1t (ht);ht)  
UW (1t (ht);ht; 
1
 ;t) = 0, we can identify 1t (ht). Consequently, we may end up with
the following outcomes: if all upgrade, the game ends; if a number of individuals, say
nt < n, upgrade and others wait, the game continues to the subgame Gn nt(ht+1); if
all wait, waiting information cascade starts. By backward induction, starting with the
subgame with one individual remaining, we can construct the equilibrium strategy
prole of the original game, GN(h1).
3 Two or More Risky Investment Options
Suppose now there are two or more risky investment options. The setting is the same
as the one in the previous section, except that there are a number of new software
packages Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, available for upgrading, where M is some nite integer
greater than 1. Assume that the true value of Aj, denoted by Vj, is chosen by
nature at the beginning of the game, and is unknown to the individuals. Individuals
know Vj follows some prior distribution Fj(Vj), with density fj(Vj). Upgrading to
Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, is an irreversible choice. Once they upgrade to Aj, they are
committed to their decisions. They cannot switch back to B, or upgrade to Am, for
m 6= j. But there is no commitment to continuing using B. If individuals have not
upgraded, they continue to have the option of doing so.
At the beginning of the game, for the new software package Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg,
individual i in the market observes some conditionally independent private signal
ji 2 fsj1; sj2; : : : ; sjDjg, where sj1 < sj2 < : : : < sjDj and Dj is some nite integer.
ji follows some distribution Fj(
j
i jVj), with density fj(ji jVj).16 Assume Fj(ji jVj)
satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) with respect to Vj:
fj(
j
i jfVj)
fj(
j
i jVj)
increasing in ji , for
eVj > Vj. That is, individuals are more likely to get a higher
16For simplicity, assume the distributions of the private signals, including the prior, are indepen-
dent. In section 5, some extension with correlated signals is discussed.
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private signal (indicating higher value of Aj) if the underlying Vj is higher. The
signal vector observed by individual i is denoted by i = (
1
i ; 
2
i ; :::; 
M
i ).
With endogenous ordering, individuals are allowed to choose the time of upgrading
to the new software package Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, or waiting (continuing using the
current software package B). There exist strategic interactions among the individuals.
The timing is the same as the one in the previous section, except that there are a
number of new software packages Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, available for upgrading. In
each period, each individual decides to upgrade to Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, or to wait,
if he has not yet upgraded. The game continues until everyone upgrades to Aj,
j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg. The benet from waiting is the information revealed about the new
software package Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, by other individuals. The cost of waiting is
the dierence between the gain from Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, and the reservation utility.
Denote individual i's action at date t by xi;t, where xi;t = j if he upgrades to Aj,
j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, at date t and xi;t = 0 if he waits. Let xt  (x1;t; :::; xN;t) denote the
outcome at date t. If individual i upgrades to Aj in period t, then in the following
periods, everyone knows individual i upgrades to Aj in period t. The history of the
game at the beginning of period t is a sequence of outcomes ht = (x1; :::; xt 1).17 The
common discount factor is  2 (0; 1).
Let ji;t(Vjji;ht) denote individual i's posterior belief about the true value of Aj
given the history of the game ht and his own information i at the beginning of period
t. The probability that individual i, who has not yet upgraded, chooses to upgrade to
Aj after observing the history ht is denoted by 
j
i;t(i;ht). Then a behavioral strategy
is a function ji;t : H ! [0; 1]. The vector of the behavioral strategy for individual i
in period t is denoted by i;t = (
1
i;t; 
2
i;t; :::; 
M
i;t ), where
MP
j=1
ji;t = 1.
Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A PBE consists of
a strategy  and a probability assessment , such that (i) each individual's strategy
is a best response at every information set and (ii) the probability assessments are
consistent with Bayes' rule at every information set that is reached with positive
probability.
Let's see the incentive for upgrading and waiting respectively. The expected ben-
et from upgrading to Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, in period t for individual i is:
UAj(i;ht) = EVj ji;htVj (3)
The expected benet from waiting in period t for individual i is:
UW (i;ht;  i;t) = EHt+1(i;ht; i;t)

max

max
j
UAj(i;ht+1);U
W (i;ht+1;  i;t+1)

(4)
17As the prior, x0 = 0 and hence h1 = x0 = 0.
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where  i;t represents the strategy prole of all other individuals except for individual
i in period t; Ht+1(i;ht; i;t) represents the set of histories at the beginning of period
t + 1 given i, ht and  i;t. From equation 4, we can solve the benet from waiting
forever UW = 0.
For Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, we say it is \inactive" or \dormant" in period t, if no
one intends to upgrade to Aj in period t. Formally, Aj is dormant in period t if
ji;t = 0 for all i remaining in the game in period t; otherwise it is active . As there
are two or more risky investment options, some investment option may be dormant
for a while and back to be active later. In contrast, with only one investment option,
if it is dormant, it will remain dormant and never be active again, as showed in lemma
1.
Consider in some period t only Aj is active while all others investment options
are dormant. The following lemma shows that if no one upgrades to Aj in period t,
then Aj will be dormant in period t+ 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose j^i;t = 0 for all i and j^ 6= j. If xt = 0, then ji;t+1 = 0 for all i.
Similar to the proof of lemma 1, for suciently pessimistic beliefs about Aj in
period t, no one is willing to upgrade to Aj, and this is the worst news for Aj. Under
this worst news for Aj in period t, individuals will not upgrade to Aj in the following
period t+1. Otherwise, suppose there were some individual upgrading to Aj in period
t + 1 under this worst news for Aj in period t. He would for sure upgrade to Aj in
period t + 1. Then, he should have upgraded to Aj in period t, other than waiting
for one more period, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 says that if only Aj is active in some period and it turns out no one
upgrades to Aj, then Aj must be \cooling o" for at least one period. With two or
more investment options, it is the turn of other investment options to be active. This
implies \information ow" must continue till either all individuals upgrade or all in-
vestment options are dormant. In the latter case, waiting information cascade starts.
Further implication is that with a nite number of N individuals, M investment op-
tions and bounded private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods before
a cascading phase starts.18
The next proposition shows that for any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone
with respect to personal private signals. That is, individuals with higher private
signals about Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, have higher incentive to upgrade to Aj.
18ConsiderM = 1. Once the only investment option is dormant, it will remain dormant and never
be active again, as showed in lemma 1. Thus, with a nite number of N individuals, the game lasts
at most N periods before a cascading phase starts. Comparatively, with two or more investment
options, some investment option may be dormant for a while and back to be active later. The game
could last much longer period of time before a cascading phase starts.
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Proposition 3 For individual i, consider i and ei, where ji > eji and j^i = ej^i , for
all j^ 6= j. For any ht and  i;t,
UAj(i;ht) max j U
A j(i;ht) > U
Aj(ei;ht) max j UA j(ei;ht)
UAj(i;ht)  UW (i;ht;  i;t) > UAj(ei;ht)  UW (ei;ht;  i;t)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, for Aj, j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, as assumed, the conditionally independent
private signals satises MLRP with respect to the true value Vj. By Bayes' rule,
the posterior distribution of Vj satises MLRP with respect to private signals. That
is, if an individual gets a higher private signal about Aj, given the same history, he
believes that Vj will be higher. Formally, for individual i, consider i and ei, where
ji >
eji and j^i = ej^i , for all j^ 6= j. We have UAj(i;ht) > UAj(ei;ht) for any ht.
Further, by lemma 2, with a nite number of N individuals,M investment options
and bounded private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods before a
cascading phase starts. Suppose either an upgrading or waiting information cascade
starts in period T . With a cascading phase starting in period T , no more new
information is disclosed thereafter. That is, UW (i;hT ;  i;T ) = UW (ei;hT ; i;T ) =
0. Thus, in period T , for any hT and  i;T
UAj(i;hT ) max j U
A j(i;hT ) > UAj(ei;hT ) max j UA j(ei;hT )
UAj(i;hT )  UW (i;hT ;  i;T ) > UAj(ei;hT )  UW (ei;hT ; i;T )
By backward induction, for any t  T
UAj(i;ht) max j U
A j(i;ht) > U
Aj(ei;ht) max j UA j(ei;ht)
UAj(i;ht)  UW (i;ht;  i;t) > UAj(ei;ht)  UW (ei;ht;  i;t)
which is true for any ht and  i;t.
Similar to the case of one investment option, we create an ordering \index" about
private signals: (;ht;  ;t) = max
j
UAj(;ht)   UW (;ht; ;t), where  ;t is the
behavior strategy prole for all other remaining individuals in period t. In addition,
let Wt(ht) denote the set of possible remaining types in period t. The following
proposition shows the existence of a unique symmetric PBE, in which individuals
with higher index of private signals upgrading earlier till a cascading phase starts.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique symmetric PBE, in which typically there is a
strategic phase, followed by a cascading phase. In the strategic phase, the equilibrium
strategy prole is a sequence of critical types ft(ht)gt and a sequence of probability of
12
critical types ft(ht)gt: in period t, individuals with (;ht;  ;t) > (t(ht);ht; ;t)
upgrade;19 the critical type individuals upgrade with probability
MP
j=1

jt (ht)
2 [0; 1);
others wait. If a cascading phase starts, all the remaining individuals in the game
either upgrade immediately or wait forever.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, by lemma 2, with a nite number of N individuals, M investment
options and bounded private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods
before a cascading phase starts. Further, by Proposition 3, for any symmetric PBE,
it must be monotone with respect to personal private signals. Consider Gn(ht), the
subgame starting from period t with history ht, where n is the number of individuals
remaining. There are three possible cases: (1) if suciently optimistic about Aj,
all the remaining individuals upgrade and Aj-upgrading information cascade occurs:
W (h ) = ; for all  > t; (2) if suciently pessimistic about all investment options,
all the remaining individuals wait and waiting information cascade starts: W (h ) =
W 1(h 1) for all   t; (3) otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity
implies there exists a critical type t(ht) such that
20
(;ht; ;t) > 0 if (;ht;  ;t) > (t(ht);ht; ;t)
(;ht; ;t) < 0 if (;ht;  ;t) < (t(ht);ht; ;t)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on the realization of
the private signals of the n individuals remaining in the game. If the realization of
the private signals is suciently optimistic such that for all the remaining individuals
(;ht;  ;t) > (t(ht);ht; ;t), they will upgrade to some investment option and the
game ends. To the contrary, if the realization of the private signals is suciently pes-
simistic such that for all the remaining individuals (;ht; ;t) < (t(ht);ht; ;t),
they will wait forever. Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) some upgrade and
others wait; (ii) some are indierent between upgrading and waiting, while others
upgrade or wait for sure.
For the latter sub-scenario, from max
j
UAj(t(ht);ht)   UW (t(ht);ht; ;t) = 0,
we can identify t(ht). Consequently, we may end up with the following outcomes:
if all upgrade, the game ends; if a number of individuals, say nt < n, upgrade and
others wait, the game continues to the subgame Gn nt(ht+1); if all wait, waiting
19As there are two or more investment options, naturally there exists \competition" among them.
Consider some individual i in period t with (i;ht; i;t) > (t(ht);ht; i;t). He upgrades to the
new software package with the highest expected benet: max
j
UAj (i;ht). If there is a tie at the top,
he will follow some tie-breaking rule to upgrade.
20As there are two or more investment options, the critical type may not be unique. In case of
multiple, there is a tie with the same value of index .
13
information cascade starts. By backward induction, starting with the subgame with
one individual remaining, we can construct the equilibrium strategy prole of the
original game, GN(h1).
Further, from the proposition above, we have the following corollary, which says
that for the sets of possible remaining types in each period, their corresponding convex
hulls contains none of the types with positive \index." This implies there is no \break"
in between for the \alien" types.
Corollary 1 For  such that (;ht; ;t) > 0,  62 conv (Wt(ht)), where conv (Wt(ht))
is the convex hull of Wt(ht).
Intuitively, the sets of possible remaining types in each period \shrinks" over
time till a cascading phase starts. Wt(ht) only contains  such that (;ht; ;t) 
(t(ht);ht;  ;t)  0. By Proposition 3, for any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone
with respect to personal private signals. Similar to Leontief preferences, conv (Wt(ht))
exclude  such that (;ht; ;t) > 0.
4 The Impact of Competition
As there are two or more risky investment options, naturally there exists \compe-
tition" among them. With more investment options, the benet from waiting is
increasing. Given the same public information available, the sets of possible remain-
ing types are enlarged for the existing investment options. This implies individuals
tend to wait longer with more investment options.
Delay is costly, but there is potential gain from information revealed by others
to make a better choice. However, overall the welfare impact is ambiguous, which is
closely tied to the discount factor. We discuss the eect of discount factor on PBE
in the following section, and then move on to the welfare properties of PBE.
4.1 The Eect of Discount Factor
In this section, we study the properties of PBE if the discount factor is suciently
small or large. By equation 4, the smaller the discount factor, the lower the benet
from waiting. The following proposition shows that there exists a lower bound , such
that if  < , individuals with positive expected benet from upgrading have no in-
centive to wait in period 1. This resembles self-decision in the one-period static game.
The dierence is that in our dynamic setting those who have not upgraded in period
1 still have the option to upgrade in the following periods. Formally, the self-decision
rule in period t is denoted by st : individuals with , such that max
j
UAj(;ht) > 0,
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upgrade; individuals with , such that max
j
UAj(;ht) < 0, wait; others will follow
some tie-breaking rule to upgrade.
Proposition 5 There exists a  2 (0; 1) such that individuals will follow the self-
decision rule s1 in period 1 if  < .
Proof. Suppose in period 1 individuals follow the self-decision rule s1. Since
the private signal space is discrete, we can always nd a j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg and j,
such that UAj(;h1)jj = min
U
A
j^ (;h1)>0
UAj^(;h1). That is, for the expected benet from
upgrading, UAj(;h1)jj is the smallest one among those greater than zero. Without
loss of generality, consider individual i with private signal i, where 
j
i = 
j and
j^i = s
j^
Dj^
for j^ 6= j. Then, set  2 (0; 1), such that UAj(i;h1) = UW (i;h1;s i;1),
where the strategy prole s i;1 indicates that all other individuals except for i adopt
the self-decision rule in period 1.
Conversely, by equation 4, the larger the discount factor, the larger the benet
from waiting. Further, by lemma 2, with a nite number of N individuals, M in-
vestment options and bounded private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of
periods before a cascading phase starts. Consequently, if  goes to one, we are more
likely to end up with the waiting information cascade.
To the extreme case, if  = 1, most individuals will wait until they are almost
certain the return to some investment option is the highest. The story is completely
dierent. The most optimistic individuals upgrade earlier, followed by others. Con-
ceivably, there is a descending order of move based on the private signals. The game
could last
Q
j
Dj periods, even though N is small.
4.2 Welfare Properties
From proposition 5, with M investment options, there exists a lower bound , such
that if  < , individuals will follow the self-decision rule s1 in period 1. Without loss
of generality, suppose there is one more investment option. Again, from proposition
5, withM+1 investment options, there exists a lower bound 0, such that if  < 0, in
period 1 individuals will follow the self-decision rule s1. With one more investment
option, the benet from waiting is increasing and individuals tend to wait longer,
which implies 0  . Consider the case that the discount factor is small such that  <
0  . In period 1, individuals still follow the self-decision rule s1 even though there
is one more investment option. In this case, ex ante, with the additional investment
option everyone will be either better o or at least as well o.
However, the story will change if the discount factor is large. By lemma 2, with
a nite number of N individuals, M investment options and bounded private sig-
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nals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods before a cascading phase starts.
Consequently, if the waiting costs are low enough, we are more likely to end up with
the waiting information cascade, even though it might be a wrong one ex post. Fur-
ther, with one more investment option, individuals tend to wait longer. This even
exaggerates the likelihood to be stuck with the waiting information cascade.
4.2.1 An Example
To illustrate, we study an example with three individuals (N = 3) and a binary
private signal system to investigate the welfare properties of the PBE. Suppose there
is a new software package A1 available for upgrading. The true value of A1, V1, is
either 1=2 or  1=2, with equal prior probability. At the beginning of the game, for
the new software package A1, individual i in the market observes some conditionally
independent private signal 1i 2 fs11; s12g, where s11 < s12. Without loss of generality,
we label s11 = L1 and s
1
2 = H1. H1 is observed with probability p1 > 1=2 if V1 = 1=2
and with probability 1   p1 if V1 =  1=2, as described in table 1. By proposition 2
Table 1: Signal Probabilities for A1
Pr(1i = L1jV1) Pr(1i = H1jV1)
V1 =  1=2 p1 1  p1
V1 = 1=2 1  p1 p1
and 5, we have the equilibrium decision rule described in table 2.
Table 2: Equilibrium Decision Rule with A1
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
 <  H1 ! A1 2A1 in t = 1! A1 |
L1 !W otherwise !W
H1 ! A1 with 2A1 in t = 1! A1 1A1 in t = 1 & 1A1 in t = 2! A1
   prob. H1 < 1 1A1 in t = 1 & H1 ! A1 otherwise !W
L1 !W otherwise  !W
Suppose there is one more new software package A2 available for upgrading, which
has the similar binary signal system as A1. The true value of A2, V2, is either 1=2
or  1=2, with equal prior probability. At the beginning of the game, for the new
software package A2, individual i in the market observes some conditionally inde-
pendent private signal 2i 2 fs21; s22g, where s21 < s22. Without loss of generality, we
label s21 = L2 and s
2
2 = H2. H2 is observed with probability p2 > 1=2 if V2 = 1=2
16
and with probability 1   p2 if V2 =  1=2.21 In addition, we assume p1 > p2 > 1=2,
which indicates signals of A1 are more accurate. By proposition 4 and 5, we have the
equilibrium decision rule described in table 3.22
By the previous arguments and proposition 5, in our example with one more
investment option A2, individuals tend to wait longer. Hence, 
0  . Consider the
case that the discount factor is in between 0 and . Without A2, individuals with
positive expected benet from upgrading have no incentive to wait in period 1. In
contrast, with one more investment option A2, some with positive expected benet
from upgrading may have incentive to wait in period 1. Waiting is costly and even
worse we might be stuck with the wrong information cascade. Overall the welfare
impact is ambiguous.
Specically, without A2, in period 1 individuals with H1 will upgrade to A1 and
those with L1 will wait as in table 2. With both A1 and A2, individuals with H1H2
may wait in period 1 as in table 3. That is to say, with one more investment option,
individuals with H1H2 may wait instead of upgrading to A1 even though they have
the signal H1 about A1. Hence, we could end up with a dilemma: more options might
be worse.23
5 Discussion and Extension
5.1 Large Number of Individuals
Consider the \large" game as the number of individuals becomes unboundedly large.
By the Law of Large Numbers, if information about some investment option Aj
disclosed is non-negligible in some period, the true value of Aj will be revealed in the
following period. Conceivably, individuals whoever upgrade must be among the most
optimistic ones. Therefore, all the relevant information is transmitted by the highest
signals, and it is irrelevant how good information might be available at lower signal
values.24
Further, the information disclosed by these most optimistic ones must be negligible
in each given period. Same spirit as proposition 7 and 8 in Chamley and Gale (1994),
in the limit the number of individuals upgrading is given by the Poisson approximation
to the binomial distribution with some parameter , so that the number of individuals
21To get the signal probabilities for A2, simply replace 
1
i with 
2
i and change the subscript 1 to
2 in table 1.
22There are some minor variations depending on the values of parameters. For more details, please
refer to the online appendix of the paper.
23It is controversial about the welfare comparison criterion, which is rendered to the online ap-
pendix of the paper.
24See Murto and Valimaki (2013) for the technical analysis of large games.
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upgrading in any given period is almost surely nite.
5.2 Correlated Private Signal Systems
For the previous analysis, we assume the distributions of the private signals, including
the prior, are independent. What if the signals are correlated? To illustrate, consider
the restaurant example in Banerjee (1992). There are two restaurants A and B next
to each other. Individuals arrive at the restaurants in sequence. Observing the choices
made by people before them, they decide on either one of the two restaurants. It is
known that only one restaurant is good, either A or B. Apart from the prior, each
individual also gets a signal says either that A is better or that B is better. Comparing
with the independent private signal systems, in the restaurant example there are two
investment options and the signals are perfectly negatively correlated. That is, if a
signal says that A is better, then it indicates that B is worse, and vice versa.
In the setting of Banerjee (1992), the order of choice is exogenously xed. In
contrast, if the order of choice is endogenized, individuals could wait before deciding
on either one of the two restaurants. As signals are perfectly negatively correlated,
waiting information cascade never happens, which is completely dierent from our
analysis with the independent signal system. However, the overall analysis is rather
complicated, and we do not yet have very precise ideas about what happens in the
general case.
5.3 Continuous Private Signal Systems
In our setting, the signal space is discrete, which is compatible with the setting of
BHW. Instead, if the signal space is continuous, our conjecture is that the main result
still holds as long as the signal space is bounded.26 Further, with continuous signal
space, we may focus on the pure strategy equilibrium, whereas we need to deal with
the possible mixed strategy if there is a tie with the discrete signal space. In addition,
back to corollary 1, with continuous signal space,Wt(ht), the set of possible remaining
types in period t, itself will be convex. Now that, Wt(ht) \shrinks" over time till a
cascading phase starts, which resembles onion-peeling in the convex hull algorithm.
26If the signal space is unbounded, we may end up with the trivial case that all others will wait
till those \fully informed" moves.
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5.4 Disclosure of Public Information and Fragility of Cas-
cades
With endogenous ordering, once a cascading phase starts, all the remaining individ-
uals either act immediately or wait forever regardless of their own private signals.
Thus, there exists either an investment surge or a collapse when information cascade
starts. Disclosure of public information could have an inuence on the strategic and
cascading behavior of individuals.
Since the public information disclosed only needs to oset the information from
individuals' actions in the last period before the waiting information cascade starts,
the waiting information cascade is not robust to the public disclosure of information,
which is similar to the fragility result of information cascade in BHW with exogenous
ordering. However, if the game falls into the upgrading information cascade, further
disclosure of public information will not have any eect since the game ends once the
upgrading information cascade occurs.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If in period t individual i chooses to wait, then UA1(1i ;ht)  UW (1i ;ht;1 i;t). By the
Martingale property,
UA1(1i ;ht) = EHt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1)
The set of historiesHt+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t) can be decomposed into two disjoint sets: H
A1
t+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t)
and HWt+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t), where H
A1
t+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t) is the set of histories in period t+1 in which
individual i will upgrade to A1 according to some strategy of individual i; H
W
t+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t)
is the set of histories in period t+1 in which individual i will wait according to some strategy
of individual i. Then we have
UA1(1i ;ht) = EHA1t+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1) + EHWt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1)
By equation 2,
UW (1i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = EHt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)[maxfU
A1(1i ;ht+1);U
W (1i ;ht+1;
1
 i;t+1)g]
= [E
H
A1
t+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1) + EHWt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UW (1i ;ht+1;
1
 i;t+1)]
Consider the case 1i;t = 0 for all i. No one upgrades in t. This is the worst news from
period t. Suppose under this worst news from period t individual i still upgrades in period
t+ 1. Then he will for sure upgrade in period t+ 1, which means HWt+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = ;.
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Back to the equations above, we have
UA1(1i ;ht) = EHA1t+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1)
UW (1i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = EHA1t+1(1i ;ht; i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1)
Since HWt+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = ;, UW (1i ;ht;1 i;t) > UW = 0.27 We have UA1(1i ;ht) >
UW (1i ;ht;
1
 i;t), which is a contradiction. Therefore, under this worst news, the wait-
ing information cascade starts in period t+ 1: 1i; = 0 for any  > t and i.
Proof of Proposition 1
As assumed, F1(
1
i jV1) satises MLRP with respect to V1. By Bayes' rule, the posterior
distribution of V1 satises MLRP with respect to private signal 
1
i :
f1(V1j1i ;ht)
f1(V1je1i ;ht) is increasing
in V1, for 
1
i >
e1i and any ht. That is, if an individual gets a higher private signal, given the
same history, he believes that V1 will be higher. According to Landsberger and Meilijson
(1990), F1(V1j1i ; ht) rst order stochastic dominates (FOSD) F1(V1je1i ; ht) for any 1i > e1i
and ht. So, U
A1(1i ;ht) > U
A1(e1i ;ht), for 1i > e1i and any ht.
Similar to the proof of lemma 1, by the Martingale property,
UA1(1i ;ht) = EHA1t+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1) + EHWt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1)
UW (1i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = [EHA1t+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UA1(1i ;ht+1) + EHWt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
UW (1i ;ht+1;
1
 i;t+1)]
Thus, for any non-negative integer k
UA1(1i ;ht)  kUW (1i ;ht;1 i;t) = (1  k+1)EHA1t+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)U
A1(1i ;ht+1)
+ EHWt+1(1i ;ht;1 i;t)
[UA1(1i ;ht+1)  k+1UW (1i ;ht+1;1 i;t+1)]
(5)
Let us check the incentives of waiting and upgrading for individual i who has a lower
private signal e1i < 1i . Similarly, we have
UA1(e1i ;ht)  kUW (e1i ;ht;1 i;t) = (1  k+1)EHA1t+1(e1i ;ht;1 i;t)UA1(e1i ;ht+1)
+ E
HWt+1(
e1i ;ht;1 i;t)[UA1(e1i ;ht+1)  k+1UW (e1i ;ht+1;1 i;t+1)] (6)
By lemma 1, with a nite number of N individuals, the game lasts at most N periods
before a cascading phase starts. Let T denote the period when a cascading phase starts.
Lemma 1 implies T  N + 1. With a cascading phase starting in period T , no more new
27Otherwise, UW (1i ;ht;
1
 i;t) = U
W = 0, in which individual i will be indierent between upgrad-
ing or waiting. Since waiting leaves the upgrading option open, it is convenient to set the tie-breaking
rule such that individual i will wait with some positive probability, which implies HWt+1(
1
i ;ht;
1
 i;t)
is not empty.
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information is disclosed thereafter. That is, UW (1i ;hT ;
1
 i;T ) = U
W (e1i ;hT ;1 i;T ) = 0.
Thus, in period T , for any hT and 1 i;T
UA1(1i ;hT )  kUW (1i ;hT ;1 i;T ) > UA1(e1i ;hT )  kUW (e1i ;hT ;1 i;T )
Back to period T  1, since information cascade starts in period T ,HA1T (1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1) =
HA1T (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1) and HWT (1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1) = HWT (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1). By equa-
tion 5 and 6, for any hT  1 and 1 i;T  1
UA1(1i ;hT  1)  kUW (1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1) > UA1(e1i ;hT  1)  kUW (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)
Considering k = 0, the equation above indicates that individuals with private signals indi-
cating higher value of A1 have a higher incentive to upgrade to A1 given the same public
history in period T   1. That is to say,
HA1T  1(
1
i ;hT  2;
1
 i;T  2)  HA1T  1(e1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2)
HWT 1(
1
i ;hT  2;
1
 i;T  2)  HWT  1(e1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2)
Back to period T   2, by equation 5 and 6,
UA1(1i ;hT  2)  kUW (1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2) = (1  k+1)EHA1T 1(e1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)UA1(1i ;hT  1)
+ (1  k+1)E
H
A1
T 1(
1
i ;hT 2;
1
 i;T 2)\HWT 1(e1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)UA1(1i ;hT  1)
+ EHWT 1(1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)[U
A1(1i ;hT  1)  k+1UW (1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)]
UA1(e1i ;hT  2)  kUW (e1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2) = (1  k+1)EHA1T 1(e1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)UA1(e1i ;hT  1)
+E
H
A1
T 1(
1
i ;hT 2;
1
 i;T 2)\HWT 1(e1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)[UA1(e1i ;hT  1)  k+1UW (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)]
+EHWT 1(1i ;hT 2;1 i;T 2)[U
A1(e1i ;hT  1)  k+1UW (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)]
For hT  1 2 [HA1T  1(1i ;hT 2;1 i;T  2) \HWT 1(e1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2)],
UW (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)  UA1(e1i ;hT  1)
which implies UA1(e1i ;hT  1)   k+1UW (e1i ;hT  1;1 i;T  1)  (1   k+1)UA1(e1i ;hT  1) <
(1  k+1)UA1(1i ;hT  1). Thus, for any hT  2 and 1 i;T  2
UA1(1i ;hT  2)  kUW (1i ;hT  2;1 i;T 2) > UA1(e1i ;hT  2)  kUW (e1i ;hT  2;1 i;T  2)
And so on, backwards further, for any t  T
UA1(1i ;ht)  kUW (1i ;ht;1 i;t) > UA1(e1i ;ht)  kUW (e1i ;ht;1 i;t)
which is true for any ht and 
1
 i;t. Set k = 0. We are done.
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Proof of Proposition 2
By lemma 1, with a nite number of N individuals, the game lasts at most N periods
before a cascading phase starts. As dened earlier, Gn(ht) denotes the subgame starting
from period t with history ht, where n is the number of individuals remaining. In addition,
W1t (ht) denotes the set of possible remaining types in period t.
By backward induction, consider the subgame with only one individual i11 remaining,
G1(ht). There are three possible cases: (1) if UA1(1;ht) > 0 for all 1 2 W1t (ht), upgrading
information cascade occurs; (2) if UA1(1;ht)  0 for all 1 2 W1t (ht), waiting information
cascade starts; (3) otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which there exists a critical type
1t (ht) 2 W1t (ht), such that (
UA1(1;ht) > 0 if 
1 > 1t (ht)
UA1(1;ht) < 0 if 
1 < 1t (ht)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i11 . If U
A1(1;ht) > 0,
i11;t = 1 and the game ends. If U
A1(1;ht) < 0, i11;t = 0 and individual i
1
1 will wait forever.
If UA1(1;ht) = U
A1(1t (ht);ht) = 0, individual i
1
1 is indierent between upgrading and
waiting and will follow some tie-breaking rule to upgrade with probability i11;t = 1t (ht)
2
[0; 1).
Now consider the subgame with two individuals i11; i
1
2 remaining, G2(ht). By Propo-
sition 1, for any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone with respect to personal private
signals. That is, individuals with higher private signals have higher incentive to upgrade.
Similar to G1(ht), there are three possible cases: (1) if UA1(1;ht) > 0 for all 1 2 W1t (ht),
upgrading information cascade occurs; (2) if UA1(1;ht)  0 for all 1 2 W1t (ht), waiting
information cascade starts; (3) otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity
implies there exists a critical type 1t (ht) 2 W1t (ht), such that(
(1;ht;
1 ;t) = UA1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) > 0 if 1 > 1t (ht)
(1;ht;
1 ;t) = UA1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) < 0 if 1 < 1t (ht)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i11 and i12 . If minfi11 ; i12g >
1t (ht), i11;t = i12;t = 1 and the game ends. If maxfi11 ; i12g < 1t (ht), i11;t = i12;t = 0
and individual i11; i
1
2 will wait forever. Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) one up-
grades and the other waits; (ii) one is indierent between upgrading and waiting, while
the other upgrades or waits for sure. For the latter sub-scenario, from (1t (ht);ht;
1 ;t) =
UA1(1t (ht);ht) UW (1t (ht);ht;1 ;t) = 0, we can identify 1t (ht).
28 Consequently, we may
end up with the following outcomes: if both upgrade, the game ends; if one upgrades and
the other waits, the game continues to G1(ht+1); if both wait, waiting information cascade
starts.
28Note, UW (1;ht;
1
 ;t) = 0 for 
1
 ;t = 0 and 
1
 ;t = 1. Therefore, U
W (1;ht;
1
 ;t) may not be
monotonic with respect to 1 ;t.
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Continue backwards to the subgame with n individuals i11; i
1
2; :::; i
1
n remaining, Gn(ht).
Similarly, there are three possible cases: (1) if UA1(1;ht) > 0 for all 
1 2 W1t (ht), upgrading
information cascade occurs; (2) if UA1(1;ht)  0 for all 1 2 W1t (ht), waiting information
cascade starts; (3) otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity implies there
exists a critical type 1t (ht) 2 W1t (ht), such that(
(1;ht;
1 ;t) = UA1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) > 0 if 1 > 1t (ht)
(1;ht;
1 ;t) = UA1(1;ht)  UW (1;ht;1 ;t) < 0 if 1 < 1t (ht)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i11 ; i12 ; :::; i1n . If
minfi11 ; i12 ; :::; i1ng > 1t (ht), i11;t = i12;t = ::: = i1n;t = 1 and the game ends. If
maxfi11 ; i12 ; :::; i1ng < 1t (ht), i11;t = i12;t = ::: = i1n;t = 0 and individual i11; i12; :::; i1n
will wait forever. Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) some upgrade and others
wait; (ii) some are indierent between upgrading and waiting, while others upgrade or wait
for sure. For the latter sub-scenario, similarly from (1t (ht);ht;
1 ;t) = UA1(1t (ht);ht)  
UW (1t (ht);ht;
1 ;t) = 0, we can identify 1t (ht)
. Consequently, we may end up with the
following outcomes: if all upgrade, the game ends; if a number of individuals, say nt < n,
upgrade and others wait, the game continues to Gn nt(ht+1); if all wait, waiting information
cascade starts.
Set n = N and ht = h1. Then Gn(ht) becomes GN (h1), which is the original game.
Proof of Proposition 3
For the new software package Aj , j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, as assumed, Fj(ji jVj) satises MLRP
with respect to Vj . By Bayes' rule, the posterior distribution of Vj satises MLRP with
respect to private signal ji :
fj(Vj jji ;ht)
fj(Vj jeji ;ht) increasing in Vj , for ji > eji . That is, if an individual
gets a higher private signal about Aj , given the same history, he believes that Vj will be
higher. According to Landsberger and Meilijson (1990), Fj(Vj jji ; ht) rst order stochastic
dominates (FOSD) Fj(Vj jeji ; ht) for any ji > eji . For individual i, consider i and ei, where
ji >
eji and j^i = ej^i for all j^ 6= j. We have UAj (i;ht) > UAj (ei;ht) for any ht.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, by the Martingale property,
UAj (i;ht) = EHAjt+1(i;ht; i;t)
UAj (i;ht+1) + EHA jt+1 (i;ht; i;t)
UAj (i;ht+1)
+ EHWt+1(i;ht; i;t)U
Aj (i;ht+1)
max
 j
UA j (i;ht) = EHAjt+1(i;ht; i;t)
max
 j
UA j (i;ht+1) + EHA jt+1 (i;ht; i;t)
max
 j
UA j (i;ht+1)
+ EHWt+1(i;ht; i;t)max j
UA j (i;ht+1)
UW (i;ht; i;t) = EHAjt+1(i;ht; i;t)
UAj (i;ht+1) + EHA jt+1 (i;ht; i;t)

max
 j
UA j (i;ht+1)

+ EHWt+1(i;ht; i;t)U
W (i;ht+1; i;t+1)
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where H
Aj
t+1(i;ht; i;t) is the set of histories in period t + 1 in which individual i will
upgrade to Aj according to some strategy of individual i; H
A j
t+1 (i;ht; i;t) is the set of
histories in period t+ 1 in which individual i will upgrade to a new software package other
than Aj according to some strategy of individual i; H
W
t+1(i;ht; i;t) is the set of histories
in period t+ 1 in which individual i will wait according to some strategy of individual i.
Thus, for any non-negative integer k
UAj (i;ht)  kmax j U
A j (i;ht) = EHAjt+1(i;ht; i;t)

UAj (i;ht+1)  kmax j U
A j (i;ht+1)

+ E
H
A j
t+1 (i;ht; i;t)

UAj (i;ht+1)  kmax j U
A j (i;ht+1)

+ EHWt+1(i;ht; i;t)

UAj (i;ht+1)  kmax j U
A j (i;ht+1)
 (7)
UAj (i;ht)  kUW (i;ht; i;t) = (1  k+1)EHAjt+1(i;ht; i;t)U
Aj (i;ht+1)
+ E
H
A j
t+1 (i;ht; i;t)

UAj (i;ht+1)  k+1max j U
A j (i;ht+1)

+ EHWt+1(i;ht; i;t)

UAj (i;ht+1)  k+1UW (i;ht+1; i;t+1)
 (8)
Let us check the incentives of waiting and upgrading for individual i who has a lower
private signal about Aj . Again, consider i and ei, where ji > eji and j^i = ej^i for all j^ 6= j.
Similarly, we have
UAj (ei;ht)  kmax j UA j (ei;ht) = EHAjt+1(ei;ht; i;t)

UAj (ei;ht+1)  kmax j UA j (ei;ht+1)

+ E
H
A j
t+1 (
ei;ht; i;t)

UAj (ei;ht+1)  kmax j UA j (ei;ht+1)

+ EHWt+1(ei;ht; i;t)

UAj (ei;ht+1)  kmax j UA j (ei;ht+1)
 (9)
UAj (ei;ht)  kUW (ei;ht; i;t) = (1  k+1)EHAjt+1(ei;ht; i;t)UAj (ei;ht+1)
+ E
H
A j
t+1 (
ei;ht; i;t)

UAj (ei;ht+1)  k+1max j UA j (ei;ht+1)

+ EHWt+1(ei;ht; i;t)
h
UAj (ei;ht+1)  k+1UW (ei;ht+1; i;t+1)i
(10)
Further, by lemma 2, with a nite number of N individuals, M investment options and
bounded private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods before a cascading
phase starts. Suppose either an upgrading or waiting information cascade starts in period
T , which means no one will upgrade after period T given history hT and strategy prole
(i;t;  i;t). With a cascading phase starting in period T , no more new information is
disclosed thereafter. That is, UW (i;hT ; i;T ) = UW (ei;hT ; i;T ) = 0. Thus, in period
T , for any hT and  i;T
UAj (i;hT )  kmax j U
A j (i;hT ) > UAj (ei;hT )  kmax j UA j (ei;hT )
UAj (i;hT )  kUW (i;hT ; i;T ) > UAj (ei;hT )  kUW (ei;hT ; i;T )
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Back to period T   1, since information cascade starts in period T ,
H
Aj
T (i;hT  1; i;T  1) = H
Aj
T (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)
H
A j
T (i;hT  1; i;T  1) = H
A j
T (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)
HWT (i;hT  1; i;T  1) = H
W
T (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)
By equation 7 { 10, for any hT  1 and  i;T  1
UAj (i;hT  1)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  1) > UAj (ei;hT  1)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  1)
UAj (i;hT  1)  kUW (i;hT  1; i;T  1) > UAj (ei;hT  1)  kUW (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)
When j = 0, the equation above implies that individuals with private signals indicating
higher value of Aj have a higher incentive to upgrade to Aj given the same public history
in period T   1. That is to say,
H
Aj
T  1(i;hT  2; i;T  2)  HAjT  1(ei;hT  2; i;T  2)
H
A j
T  1(i;hT  2; i;T  2)  HA jT  1(ei;hT  2; i;T  2)
HWT  1(i;hT  2; i;T  2)  HWT  1(ei;hT  2; i;T  2)
Back to period T   2, by equation 7 and 9, we have
UAj (i;hT  2)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  2) = EHAjT 1(i;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (i;hT  1)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  1)

+ E
H
A j
T 1 (i;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (i;hT  1)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  1)

+ EHWT 1(i;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (i;hT  1)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  1)

UAj (ei;hT  2)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  2) = EHAjT 1(ei;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (ei;hT  1)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  1)

+ E
H
A j
T 1 (ei;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (ei;hT  1)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  1)

+ EHWT 1(ei;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (ei;hT  1)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  1)

As UAj (i;hT  1)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  1) > UAj (ei;hT  1)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  1) for
any hT  1 and  i;T  1, we have
UAj (i;hT  2)  kmax j U
A j (i;hT  2) > UAj (ei;hT  2)  kmax j UA j (ei;hT  2)
Similarly, by equation 8 and 10, we have
UAj (i;hT  2)  kUW (i;hT  2; i;T  2) = (1  k+1)EHAjT 1(ei;hT 2; i;T 2)UAj (i;hT  1)
+ (1  k+1)E
H
Aj
T 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)\H
A j
T 1 (ei;hT 2; i;T 2)UAj (i;hT  1)
+ (1  k+1)E
H
Aj
T 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)\HWT 1(ei;hT 2; i;T 2)UAj (i;hT  1)
+ E
H
A j
T 1 (i;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (i;hT  1)  k+1max j U
A j (i;hT  1)

+ EHWT 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)

UAj (i;hT  1)  k+1UW (i;hT  1; i;T  1)

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UAj (ei;hT  2)  kUW (ei;hT  2; i;T  2) = (1  k+1)EHAjT 1(ei;hT 2; i;T 2)UAj (ei;hT  1)
+ (1  k+1)E
H
Aj
T 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)\H
A j
T 1 (ei;hT 2; i;T 2)UAj (ei;hT  1)
+ E
H
Aj
T 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)\HWT 1(ei;hT 2; i;T 2)
h
UAj (ei;hT  1)  k+1UW (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)i
+ E
H
A j
T 1 (i;hT 2; i;t)

UAj (ei;hT  1)  k+1max j UA j (ei;hT  1)

+ EHWT 1(i;hT 2; i;T 2)
h
UAj (ei;hT  1)  k+1UW (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)i
For hT  1 2 [HAjT  1(i;hT  2; i;T  2)\HWT  1(ei;hT  2; i;T  2)], UW (ei;hT  1; i;T  1) 
UAj (ei;hT  1), which implies UAj (ei;hT  1) k+1UW (ei;hT  1; i;T  1)  (1 k+1)UAj (ei;hT  1) <
(1  k+1)UAj (i;hT  1). Thus,
UAj (i;hT  2)  kUW (i;hT  2; i;T  2) > UAj (ei;hT  2)  kUW (ei;hT  2; i;T  2)
And so on, backwards further, for any t  T
UAj (i;ht)  kmax j U
A j (i;ht) > U
Aj (ei;ht)  kmax j UA j (ei;ht)
UAj (i;ht)  kUW (i;ht; i;t) > UAj (ei;ht)  kUW (ei;ht; i;t)
which is true for any ht and  i;t. Set k = 0. We are done.
Proof of Proposition 4
By lemma 2, with a nite number of N individuals, M investment options and bounded
private signals, the game lasts for a nite number of periods before a cascading phase starts.
As dened earlier, Gn(ht) denotes the subgame starting from period t with history ht, where
n is the number of individuals remaining. In addition, Wt(ht) denotes the set of possible
remaining types in period t.
By backward induction, consider the subgame with only one individual i1 remaining,
G1(ht). There are three possible cases: (1) if there exists j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, such that
UAj (;ht) > max
(
max
j^ 6=j
UAj^ (;ht); 0
)
for all  2 Wt(ht), Aj-upgrading information cascade
occurs; (2) if max
j
UAj (;ht)  0 for all  2 Wt(ht), waiting information cascade starts; (3)
otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which there exists a critical type t(ht) 2 Wt(ht),
such that29 8<: maxj U
Aj (;ht) > 0 if max
j
UAj (;ht) > max
j
UAj (t(ht);ht)
max
j
UAj (;ht) < 0 if max
j
UAj (;ht) < max
j
UAj (t(ht);ht)
29For the case that UAj (;ht)  0 for all  2 Wt(ht), Aj will drop out of the race as no one has
incentive to upgrade to Aj anymore.
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As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i1 . If max
j
UAj (i1 ;ht) > 0,
individual i1 will upgrade and the game ends. If max
j
UAj (i1 ;ht) < 0, i1;t = 0 and individ-
ual i1 will wait forever. Otherwise, max
j
UAj (;ht) = max
j
UAj (t(ht);ht) = 0. Individual
i1 is indierent between upgrading and waiting and will follow some tie-breaking rule to
upgrade with probability t(ht) 2 [0; 1).
Now consider the subgame with two individuals i1; i2 remaining, G2(ht). By Propo-
sition 3, for any symmetric PBE, it must be monotone with respect to personal private
signals. That is, individuals with higher private signals have higher incentive to upgrade.
Similar to G1(ht), there are three possible cases: (1) if there exists j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, such
that UAj (;ht) > max
(
max
j^ 6=j
UAj^ (;ht); 0
)
for all  2 Wt(ht), Aj-upgrading information
cascade occurs; (2) if max
j
UAj (;ht)  0 for all  2 Wt(ht), waiting information cascade
starts; (3) otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity implies there exists a
critical type t(ht) 2 Wt(ht), such that
(;ht; ;t) > 0 if (;ht; ;t) > (t(ht);ht; ;t)
(;ht; ;t) < 0 if (;ht; ;t) < (t(ht);ht; ;t)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i1 and i2 . If
minf(i1 ;ht; ;t); (i2 ;ht; ;t)g > (t(ht);ht; ;t), they will upgrade to some new soft-
ware package and the game ends. If maxf(i1 ;ht; ;t); (i2 ;ht; ;t)g > (t(ht);ht; ;t),
they will wait forever. Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) one upgrades and the
other waits; (ii) one is indierent between upgrading and waiting, while the other upgrades
or waits for sure. For the latter sub-scenario, from (t(ht);ht; ;t) = max
j
UAj (t(ht);ht) 
UW (t(ht);ht; ;t) = 0, we can identify t(ht). Consequently, we may end up with the
following outcomes: if both upgrade, the game ends; if one upgrades and the other waits,
the game continues to G1(ht+1); if both wait, waiting information cascade starts.
Continue backwards to the subgame with n individuals i1; i2; :::; in remaining, Gn(ht).
Similarly, there are three possible cases: (1) if there exists j 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg, such that
UAj (;ht) > max
(
max
j^ 6=j
UAj^ (;ht); 0
)
for all  2 Wt(ht), Aj-upgrading information cascade
occurs; (2) if max
j
UAj (;ht)  0 for all  2 Wt(ht), waiting information cascade starts; (3)
otherwise, strategic phase continues, in which continuity implies there exists a critical type
t(ht) 2 Wt(ht), such that
(;ht; ;t) > 0 if (;ht; ;t) > (t(ht);ht; ;t)
(;ht; ;t) < 0 if (;ht; ;t) < (t(ht);ht; ;t)
As for the realization, there are three scenarios depending on i1 ; i2 ; :::; in .
If minf(i1 ;ht; ;t); (i2 ;ht; ;t); :::; (in ;ht; ;t)g > (t(ht);ht; ;t), all indi-
viduals will upgrade to some new software package and the game ends. If
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maxf(i1 ;ht; ;t); (i2 ;ht; ;t); :::; (in ;ht; ;t)g < (t(ht);ht; ;t), all individuals
will wait forever. Otherwise, there are two sub-scenarios: (i) some upgrade and others
wait; (ii) some are indierent between upgrading and waiting, while others upgrade or wait
for sure. For the latter sub-scenario, similarly from (t(ht);ht; ;t) = 0, we can identify
t(ht). Consequently, we may end up with the following outcomes: if all upgrade, the game
ends; if a number of individuals, say nt < n, upgrade and others wait, the game continues
to Gn nt(ht+1); if all wait, waiting information cascade starts.
Set n = N and ht = h1. Then Gn(ht) becomes GN (h1), which is the original game.
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